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A B S T R A C T
What is the role of innovation policy for accomplishing renewal of mature industries in Western economies? Drawing upon an unusually rich dataset spanning 9752
digitized archival documents, we categorize and code decisions taken by policymakers on several levels while also mapping and quantifying the strategic activities of
both entrant firms and incumbent monopolists over a decade. Our data concerns two empirical cases from Sweden during the time period 1980–1990: the financial
sector and the telecommunications sector. In both industries, a combination of technological and institutional upheaval came into motion during this time period
which in turn fueled the revitalization of the Swedish economy in the subsequent decades. Our findings show that Swedish policymakers in both cases consistently
acted in order to promote the emergence of more competition and de novo entrant firms at the expense of established monopolies. The paper quantifies and
documents this process while also highlighting several enabling conditions. In conclusion, the results indicate that successful innovation policy in mature economies
is largely a matter of strategically dealing with resourceful vested interest groups, alignment of expectations, and removing resistance to industrial renewal.
1. Introduction
During the last couple of decades, we have seen an increased
awareness of the role of innovation not only for economic development
per se, but also for dealing with challenges that come with globaliza-
tion, digitalization, social polarization and environmental changes.
Innovation enables both firms and economies to transcend established
trade-offs, e.g. between cost and value on the firm level and between
e.g. economic growth and sustainability on the societal level.
As a consequence, the topic of innovation policy is of strategic im-
portance for both developed and emerging countries in order to remain
competitive and sustainable. Here, innovation policy can be defined as
actions taken by government bodies with the purpose of generating
more innovation in society (Edler and Fagerberg, 2017).
While developing economies phase a range of challenges such as
resource attraction, technology development, pollution, access to
skilled labour and crafting of institutions that enable innovation to take
place, developed economies have their own set of challenges, including
low-cost competition from other countries, technological lock-in, en-
vironmental and social consequences of industrial progress, various
forms of systems failures, and renewal initiatives being blocked by
vested interest groups (Mokyr, 1994). Innovation and renewal of ma-
ture industries is therefore a non-trivial matter in Western economies.
At the same time, advanced economies are pressed by changes in de-
mography, increased mobility on the labour market and the rise of
countries like China and India as both low-cost competitors and tech-
nological powerhouses of their own.
While the role of policy for innovation and renewal in developed
economies has been a hot topic among scholars for many decades
(Lerner, 2009; Mazzucato, 2013), there are presently few detailed
empirical descriptions of successful contemporary industrial renewal.
Specifically, there are few field-level, historical accounts of how entire
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T
industries have adopted a novel technological and institutional regime
which explicitly document and disentangle the interplay between firm
strategies and policy initiatives over a longer time period.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the role of policy in ac-
complishing path-breaking renewal in established Western industries,
while also highlighting enabling and constraining conditions. Our
overall research problem concerns how Technological Transitions (TTs)
can be accomplished, and in particular, what is the role of policy in
generating such transitions. Our research question can therefore be
formulated as follows: how can policycontribute to Technological
Transitions? We are also interested in why policymakers may act in
order to favor non-incumbent interest groups rather than being capti-
vated by the status quo (c.f. Karlson, 2017). Economic theory usually
tells a story of policy being appropriated by actors with superior fi-
nancial and relational resources, thereby blocking renewal (Rotmans
et al, 2001).
Drawing upon an unusually rich archival data-set spanning firms
and policymakers in two industries over a decade, we code and quantify
policies and strategies in order to explain how a new socio-technical
regime is accomplished.
Our two case industries come from the Swedish economy, which is
usually ranked as one of the top ten countries worldwide on the Global
Competitiveness Index by the World Economic Forum. In addition to
the benefits of being an open economy with strengths in export-oriented
goods, Sweden is among the world's leading countries in some high-
technology industries such as Information and Communication
Technologies (ICTs) and knowledge-intensive services (European
Commission, 2015). Sweden experienced a remarkable process of re-
newal during the 1980s and 1990s in the financial exchanges industry
and in telecommunications. The world's first fully electronic stock ex-
change was launched in Sweden in 1989 and the exchange was the first
in the world to be privatized in 1992. In the telecommunications sector,
Sweden and the Nordic countries paved the way for full scale mobile
telephony with the advent and diffusion of mobile telephony in the
1980s with the NMTsystem (Nordic Mobile Telephony) and subse-
quently with GSM. Today, Stockholm, the capital of Sweden, is hosting
the highest density of unicorns after Silicon Valley, mostly within In-
formation Technology. The events in the 1980s in the financial industry
and in telecommunications have in many ways paved the way for
subsequent revitalization of the Swedish economy. Mapping and dis-
entangling these events and the role of policy is therefore of consider-
able interest to both policymakers and academics.
We begin this article with a condensed literature review on
Technological Transitions (TTs) and systemic innovation policy, while
also situating our paper in more detail in relation to current research.
Next, our data sources and our methodological approach is described in
more detail. This is followed by case descriptions from the financial
sector and the telecommunications sector. Eventually, an analysis is
provided along with a discussion and some concluding remarks.
2. Previous research on innovation policy and industrial renewal
Technological Transitions (TTs) can be defined as substantial al-
terations in the way a certain societal function is handled. As such, TTs
do not only concern changes in technology, but also changes in reg-
ulation, division of labor, practices and possibly in value creation and
distribution (Geels, 2004). Grin et al. (2011) refer to TTs as funda-
mental changes in the deep structure of the incumbent regime. TTs,
thus, ultimately concern the interplay between technological, eco-
nomic, regulatory and other institutional factors where a certain tech-
nology's value comes from its deployment in an embedded socio-eco-
nomic setting. As technology is intertwined with practices and routines,
in power structures, separations of work and in institutional arrange-
ments, TTs are usually difficult to generate through isolated deliberate
action. Rather, TTs arise through new combinations of alternative be-
havior, by aggregates of actors, not always coordinated. Furthermore,
since new technology is frequently incompatible with existing socio-
institutional frameworks (Freeman and Perez, 1988a, 1988b), TTs call
for a combined change of both technology and institutions.
Drawing on contributions in Evolutionary Economics (Nelson and
Winter, 1982) and Technology Studies (e.g. Latour, 1991), Geels (2004)
developed a multi-level framework for assessing TTs. This framework
consists of several interrelated layers. The layer directly related to the
technology and its usage is referred to as the Socio-technical regime (ST).
The ST is a collection of actors and institutions such as firms, meanings,
customers and regulations directly governing the adoption and devel-
opment of technology. At this level, technologies still evolve, but they
usually do so in an incremental manner. This is because the actors of the
regime hold their current position as a result of the current technolo-
gical paradigm, and any threat to that is thus also a threat to their
current position in the societal and industrial hierarchy. Thus, although
the actors of the regime may hold capacity to initiate and implement
wider changes, they usually lack incentives to do so (Battilana, 2006);
Rotmans et al., 2001).
According to Geels (2004), radically new technologies are instead
generated in niches, i.e. sheltered domains of the ST where substantially
different and still immature technologies may develop and grow, pro-
tected from the structuration forces of the regime during the maturation
process (Kemp et al., 1998). If successful in the maturation process, new
technologies developed through selection processes of niche experi-
ments may challenge and ultimately replace the old technologies of the
regime. The ST can thus be regarded as a meso-level where stability
exists, whereas the niche is a micro-environment where a new tech-
nology can be nurtured without distorting an established ST.
The Landscape level concerns the overall macroeconomic constella-
tions of society which go beyond the ST and can be regarded as external
factors, or the broader context in which regulation is defined and action
takes place. The Landscape thus includes the overall material wealth of
a society, unrelated socio-technical arrangements and broader trends.
On this level, changes usually happen slowly in the form of cultural,
demographic and broader political changes. Moreover, these changes
are usually beyond any actor's direct control, at least within the ST.
These three levels – niches, socio-technical regimes and the land-
scape, are nested, i.e. niches are embedded in regimes and regimes are
embedded in landscapes. In highlighting the role of different levels and
their nested nature, the multi-level framework emphasizes several en-
abling factors for TTs to come about. First, niches are very important as
they present an opportunity for technology to evolve in a context where
it is undisturbed. Second, TTs can only take place if the appropriate
conditions are aligned on all three levels (Kemp et al., 1998). Niches,
while important, are not by themselves sufficient prerequisites for TTs
to come about. On the contrary, most innovations remain on the niche
level and never make it into a full TT, usually because the ST and the
landscape are not aligned with it.
2.1. Barriers to Technological Transitions (TTs)
As stated by Geels (2004), a novel technology is usually blocked
from widespread diffusion when it enters the ST. Here, a collection of
barriers exists. Broadly speaking, forces of path dependency within the
ST often result in technological lock-in and resistance to change (Dosi,
1982).
Previous research has identified a collection of forces that jointly
result in such lock-in. First, actors of the ST may not be able to co-
ordinate themselves sufficiently to adapt a novel technology. A collec-
tive action problem may prevail where no one single actor is able to
reap sufficient benefits to bear the burden of enacting a change
(Glasmeier, 1991), sometimes also referred to as market failure (Arrow,
1962). This pattern has been described as a system failure within cur-
rent literature. Examples include lack of capabilities, lack of incentives
and interdependencies resulting in lock-in.
New technologies may also meet considerable resistance from
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vested interest groups who benefit from the status quo. TTs therefore
often require that some actor groups are decimated or removed com-
pletely. Such actors will have asymmetrically strong incentives to block
those agents who try to generate a TT. At the same time, actors with
strong incentives to challenge established regimes may not have the
capacity to do so. According to Battilana (2006) successful change
agents – sometimes referred to as institutional entrepreneurs – are most
likely found in the mid-level of societal and industrial hierarchies; they
hold a certain degree of dissatisfaction with the current regime stan-
dards, which gives them strong enough incentives to initiate change;
they also hold a certain degree of power and influence in the commu-
nity, which give them capacity to realize their ambitions.
Third, a novel technology may not be compatible with the existing
institutional regime. Both formal and information institutions may need
to be altered in order to be compatible with a new technology. Such
processes may be blocked by vested interest groups who are able to
capture the regulatory process to their favor (Acemoglu and Robinson,
2006) due to superior financial and relational resources.
2.2. Innovation policy and TTs
A range of different policy implications can be derived from Geels'
(2004) multi-level framework for TTs. Previous research has high-
lighted that policy can play a role in actively creating niches, i.e. nur-
sing markets where technology can be incubated and further developed
(Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004). Second, systems failure may require
policy in order to coordinate dispersed actors. Third, government in-
vestments in R&D and development of new technologies may be mo-
tivated in the early stages, as little financial gains can be reaped due to
insufficient microeconomic incentives (Arrow, 1962).
By and large, innovation policy in the Western world has been built
around the notion that governments can support innovation and
thereby stimulate economic growth, as innovation ultimately leads to
economic growth (Mazzucato, 2013). Innovation policy has been
broadly concerned with creating the support required to overcome
market or systems failure (Laranja et al., 2008), recently described by
Schot and Steinmueller (2016) as innovation policy 1.0. and 2.0. Ac-
cording to these scholars, innovation policy 1.0 has been mainly di-
rected to R&D-based innovation, drawing on a linear model in which
scientific progress ultimately lead to advancement of technology. In-
novation policy 2.0, on the other hand, is underpinned by the systems
of innovation perspective and acknowledges a significantly broader
knowledge base for innovation and, as a consequence, seeks to
strengthen the link between discovery and application of knowledge in
a non-linear manner (c.f. Kline and Rosenberg, 1990). An alternative
approach that has gained increased interest in the recent decade is re-
ferred to by Schot and Steinmuller (2016) as innovation policy 3.0. This
alternative approach explicitly targets societal needs and the so called
grand societal challenges. Due to the inherent complexity of these so-
cietal challenges, innovation policy 3.0 targets the achievement of
system wide transformations in which technology is merely one di-
mension among many. What is ultimately targeted is the behavior of
actors and whole societies (Kivimaa and Kern, 2016).
One crucial element of innovation policy 3.0, targeting system wide
transformation, is the directionality of aggregates of actors (Weber and
Rohracher, 2012), highlighting the need for moving beyond a focus on
generating innovations in as effective mode as possible, but also con-
tributing to a particular direction of transformative change. Such di-
rectionality is also dependent on coordination among actors of the so-
cietal system, partly in terms of demand articulation and legitimacy of
new technologies, but also in terms of coordination of policy measures
targeting different sectors and societal levels (Grillitsch et al., 2019).
One concrete illustration of such an alternative approach to in-
novation policy is provided by Potts et al. (2016) who states that there
are usually both winners and losers in TTs, and thus innovations usually
have both “friends” and “enemies”. Enemies are those actors who may
lose from the introduction of an innovation. It could be a firm that is
rendered obsolete or a collection of workers performing a particular
function that is to be removed by new technology (Juma, 2016). To
these actors, it is rational to devote time and effort towards blocking an
innovation from being diffused. Low degree of directionality and lack of
shared demand articulation on the system level would thus allow such
friends and enemies to nurture their position in such a landscape of
vested interests, while increased directionality and shared demand ar-
ticulation would move the TT as a whole forward at a higher pace. It is
thus in the interest of innovation policy 3.0 to bridge such vested in-
terests, which in turn requite quite some degree of policy coordination
and learning (Grillitsch et al., 2019). Such coordination and learning
would require adaptation both on the level of actors, networks and
institutions, allowing for a novel policy rationale.
With this distinction between friends and enemies with vested in-
terest, and the policy system's ultimate strive for directionality on a
system level in mind, innovation policy can be analyzed by drawing
upon public interest theories which consider policy to be the outcome
of interest group competition, where businesses work jointly to secure
its own interests against other actors in society (). In a similar fashion,
economists regard policy as captivated by industry who receive benefits
from politicians in exchange for control over entry, prices and direct
subsidies in exchange for votes and contributions (Shaffer, 1995).
Public choice theory takes the core assumptions of economics in terms
of scarce resources and rational self-maximizing behavior into the
realm of politics (Buchanan, 1980). Under these assumptions, policy-
making is regarded as a marketplace where interest groups, voters,
politicians and bureaucrats exchange favors. Empirical investigations
usually tell a story of vested interest groups engaging in regulatory
capture, shaping formal institutions to their benefit due to superior
resources and at the expense of entrant firms (Lawrence Carleheden,
1999). As such, public choice theory and related economic literature on
competition and regulatory change pay little attention to contingencies
or firm characteristics.
2.3. Synthesis and research gap
From the above point of view, innovation policy becomes a matter
of overcoming resistance from vested interest groups and of arriving at
agreed directionality, demand articulation and coordination. However,
the public choice perspective indicates that such policies are costly to
enact for policymakers. A support initiative has a private beneficiary in
the form of certain actors who e.g. receive R&D grants. The cost for
such an initiative is the tax burden incurred upon the general public,
which is usually negligible compared to a government budget. Policies
devoted to removing resistance will, on the other hand, often lack any
private beneficiary, while at the same time imposing considerable harm
upon the resisting interest group. Such policies are therefore difficult to
enact by vote-maximizing politicians and therefore regulatory capture
often takes place.
More empirical research is therefore needed concerning the role of
policy in accomplishing a TT. Specifically, we are interested in ad-
vancing our understanding of how policy can contribute to avoid reg-
ulatory capture and how such policies can be politically justified. As
stated above, economic theory often tells a story of vested interest
groups blocking change, stimulating “more evolution than revolution”
(Rotmans et al, 2001). This paper explores exceptions to this pattern,
and seek explanations to these exceptions. Insights from the study thus
contribute to advance both the theory and practice of transition and
innovation policy.
3. Method and case selection
In order to study industrial renewal in Western economies from a
transitions point of view, we draw on data from the telecommunica-
tions sector and the financial exchange sectors in Sweden. As processes
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of renewal take considerable time, we follow a number of previous
studies in using a systematic historical approach suitable to analyze
how processes and patterns of renewal during industry transitions un-
fold over time, take into account the role of context and actors at
multiple levels of analyses (e.g. Geels, 2004; Reichardt et al., 2016;
Turnheim & Geels, 2013).
The two sectors provide particularly interesting comparative his-
torical cases for understanding of successful policy renewal of regulated
sectors in mature economies. Both the telecommunication and financial
sectors have been characterized by monopolies that persisted since their
inauguration. In both cases new technologies and products – mobile
telephony and options – triggered the emergence of new actors on an
initially closed market where unique efforts of institutional en-
trepreneurship and non-market activities leveraged these to slowly
dismantle the existing de jure and de facto monopolies. In both cases
these activities started out in an ambiguous regulatory environment
where the Stockholm Stock Exchange had a monopoly on equity trading
that did not include options trading and the Swedish Televerket had a
monopoly on fixed line telecommunications that did not include mobile
communications. In a similar manner for both cases, this was not a case
of the regulators intentionally separating the market into several ni-
ches, but rather a case where regulation was not keeping pace with
technological advancements. Finally, in both cases this regulatory am-
biguity gave rise to new entrants operating in niche markets separated
from the main markets of the incumbents. While, both these ventures
were initiated by institutional entrepreneurs acting on unique oppor-
tunities, their efforts in changing institutions continued with increasing
intensity until the actual removal of the monopolies that ended up
merging the previously distinct markets.
The two cases stand out as success stories of combined technological
and institutional renewal. In the financial sector, the Stockholm Stock
Exchange was the first exchange in the world to offer a fully digital
exchange system in 1989 and the first national stock exchange to be
privatized in 1992. Relatedly, the entrant firm OptionsMäklarna's
(OM's) platform for options trading was allowed to co-exist with the
government monopoly in the 1980s, despite creating considerable in-
stitutional turbulence. In the telecommunications sector, the Swedish
government monopoly and regulator, Televerket, was progressively
decimated during the 1980s. On numerous occasions, government de-
cisions were made to favor Comvik, the entrant firm and various po-
licies were enacted to pave the way for a market structure were
Televerket would become one out of several players.
The changes described above have paved the way for Sweden be-
coming home to one of the most vibrant digital start-up scenes in the
world. Sweden's high levels of Internet penetration and sophisticated
use of digital technology as fueled the growth of such success stories
such as Spotify, Klarna and iZettle which places Sweden second only to
Silicon Valley in terms of hosting billion-dollar start-ups. The changes
we study in the telecommunications and financial sectors in the 1980s
are interesting because they created conditions for revitalizing the
Swedish economy.
3.1. Data collection: digital archives
We collected archival data from 18 organizational and personal
archives: 9 archives covering the Swedish telecommunications sector
and 9 archives covering the financial exchange sector (see appendix 1
for archive details and method). The archives were selected to cover
two sectors incumbent monopolists, entrants, government department,
supervisory bodies, government official investigations and key interest
groups (labor union and industry association). (See Table 1.)
The different types of archival documentary sources and for the two
sectors is presented in Tables 2 and 3. The data consisting of meeting
minutes and related documents, mail correspondence, regulatory re-
ferral answers and opinions and strategic planning document. In addi-
tion to primary archival sources, we also collected complementary news
articles. For press & media mentions, both Televerket and Stockholm
Stock Exchange collected all the mentions in the media for most of the
period available in archive folders. For complete coverage of the period,
we complemented these with keyword search in a news database cov-
ering all 4 major Swedish newspapers (Digidaily).
All the data photographed, OCR processed into PDF-format and text
and input with enriched structured metadata in a FileMaker relational
database. The database enabled us to search for words and sentences in
the full text documents or based on document metadata (date, author,
organization etc.). This was done within the scope of a larger research
project concerning the interplay between technological and regulatory
change. The Stockholm Stock Exchange data (SSE) contains a total of
2608 documents, which have also been photographed, digitalized and
OCR-processed.
Using a search function available in the digital database, we have
identified actors such as politicians, regulatory bodies and government
departments related to both sectors. Decisions, statements and docu-
ments have been extracted and coded, making it possible to quantify
the different activities of regulators, entrants and incumbent firms.
Decisions by policymakers on various levels were coded as either being
in favor of the entrant, favoring the incumbent monopolist or being
neutral (Figs. 1 and 2).
With regard to the financial sector, the involved supervision au-
thorities were identified as well as their different activities. All relevant
documents where decisions regarding market regulation mentioned
entrant/incumbents. Next, coding as in favor or against the incumbent
was performed. In the category favoring the monopoly, suggestions and
activities aimed to let separate options exchanges be absorbed by the
SSE are placed. In those cases where arguments in favor of competition
and a private, competing exchange were brought forward, these were
coded as favoring competition.
A similar strategy was employed concerning the telecommunica-
tions sector. The first category dealt with internal and external activity
of Comvik and Televerket, this category includes management minutes,
letter correspondence and meeting protocols. These files contain in-
formation about both Comvik and Televerket as well as other actors
such as politicians in government and parliament, and government
agencies that implement, interprets make decisions out of parliament
and government guidelines and decisions. The second category is the
decisions made by the government and the government agencies,
mostly the NO agency, that reflects the outcome of the activity of the
first category.
4. Empirical data
During the 1970 and 1980s, a combination of new ideas and new
technology gradually affected political and public opinion towards in-
stitutional change in Sweden. In Sweden, the social democratic party
lost their first election since the 1930s in 1976 to a liberal/conservative
coalition. Also, the social democratic party, who returned to govern-
ment power in 1982, became more market oriented than before (Malm
Lindberg and Ljunggren, 2014).
In both the telecom and financial industries, the current government
proposes new regulation that is in turn accepted or rejected by the
parliament. To support the proposals, public inquiries into possible
routes of regulation are made. In both industries, technological in-
novation spurred jolts that forced a renegotiation of current regulations
leading to several such inquiries during the 1980s and 1990s. The
virtue of competition and innovation was emphasized in many parts of
society including state investigations, policy referrals. Below, we
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describe how these events unfolded in the financial and tele-
communications sectors respectively.
4.1. The stock exchange industry in Sweden
In the financial markets, an overhaul of the stock markets that came
into law in 1979 opened up for an entrant options market to comple-
ment the legally monopolized stock market. The entrant firm was
named OptionsMäklarna (OM), and offered the world's first fully
electronic stock exchange in 1985. This in turn led to an investigation
into how this and another emerging options markets should be regu-
lated. By 1989, the end result of this investigation was inconclusive
leading to a final investigation recommending a complete overhaul of
the financial markets including a liberalization removing the earlier
monopoly of marketplaces that was accepted and came into law by the
beginning of 1992. (See Table 4.)
4.1.1. Regulation and oversight
While there were already influences in the regulatory process
coming from the more liberal US market, the main intervention in the
Swedish policy process was an unofficial shadow investigation ordered
by SNS which is a think tank that promotes cooperation between so-
ciety and business. The author of this report was the Chicago economist
Merton Miller, who later received the Nobel Prize. His final report made
a strong case for a liberalized Swedish financial market where fair
competition between different marketplaces and high degree of market
self-regulation was the best option. While there is no objective way to
assess the impact of this shadow investigation, the final law proposal
was largely in line with his recommendations than the official in-
vestigation. What also likely influenced this development was the in-
ternal change at the department of Finance where a specific depart-
ment, “financial institutions and markets”, was created in 1989. The
department that became responsible for developing the law proposal
became headed by an economist (Stefan Ingves) and recruited several
financial economists, a shift from the previous dominance of personnel
with law background. According to the head of the department at the
time, these changes with support from politicians was important in
bringing in economic expertise and a future oriented policy reform
focus for the financial sector (Interview).
The main issue on the financial market being the formal monopoly
of the Stockholm Stock that did not include options Exchange (SSE) that
was challenged by the emerging options market offered by OM from
1984 and forward. Fig. 1 below contains statements from the super-
visory body called the Royal Bank Inspection. The figure starts in 1984
and contains information regarding whether the Royal Bank Inspection
and other government bodies made decisions favoring the entrant OM
or not. The figure starts in 1984 where the inspection started an eva-
luation process that ended in a license to operate, first to OM and less
than a year later to SOFE, a competing options exchange. The bulk of
the pro incumbent statements on the other hand can be traced back to
the inspection starting out with the opinion that OM and later SOFE in
the end should become part of the Stockholm Stock Exchange, which is
a position that they moved away from by the final proposition on the
future of the financial markets in 1989. In terms of neutral treatment,
the main discussions concerned the financial transaction tax in which
the inspection treated both the emerging options exchanges and the
incumbent stock exchange in a similar manner. In general, we see that
policies were not designed to favor established interest groups.
Table 1
Types of empirical data.
Source type Swedish telecom sector Swedish financial exchange sector
Number of documents Number of words Number of documents Number of words
Strategic planning documents 273 2,261,181 106 400,805
Board & management minutes, (including board memorandum) 4731 2,278,352 634 359,652
Correspondence 562 305,274 336 177,231
Administrative organizational documents & financial reporting 334 1,028,465 311 1,018,761
Regulatory documents, referral answers, opinions & hearings 844 3,336,972 399 1,200,086
Press & Media 296 2,284,664 767 1,065,455
Interviews 1 20 191,636
Other 77 102,836 61 51,747
Table 2
List of archival sources related to the telecommunications sector. In total, 7118
documents are available electronically.
Archive
Televerket and Telia archives
Televerket Company archives (Swedish National Archives)
PTS (Swedish National Archives), also contains correspondence with the entrant
firms Comvik and Europolitan
Archive of the Department of Communication (Swedish National Archives)
Archives of Director General Tony Hagström (Swedish National Archives)
Archives of Statsanställdas förbund (Union archive, ARAB)
Televerket Department of Strategic Planning archive
Liberalisering, regler och marknader, SOU 2005:4 (Committee archive, (Swedish
National Archives)
Postoch Teleutredningen 1990:27, prop 1992/93:200
Company and interest organization publications from the National Library of Sweden
(KB)
Table 3
List of archival sources related to the Stockholm Stock Exchange. In total, 2634
documents are available electronically.
Archive and repository
The Stenhammar archive donated by OM's founder Olof Stenhammar.
Repository: CfN (Centre for Business history)
Stockholm Stock Exchange archive donated by Ingemar Eliasson.
Repository: National Archive, Marieberg.
Holdings of official documents at the Royal Library.
Repository: Stockholm Stock Exchange
The Royal Bank Inspection records on SSE
Repository: National Archive, Arninge.
SOU 1989:72 “Värdepappersmarknadskommittén” (19 volumes, SE/RA/323989).”
Repository: National Archive Marieberg
Ministry of Finance archive from the development of SOU 1989:73.
Repository: National Archive Arninge
The Swedish Securities Dealers Association (SSDA).
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4.1.2. Competitive dynamics
Earlier research into the dynamics between the entrant options
market and the regulatory bodies show to what extent and how its
corporate political activities fed into the regulatory process (Ernkvist,
2015). Hence, while the explicit strategies of the entrant options market
helped shape the regulatory process, perhaps more interestingly the
incumbent stock exchange was surprisingly absent from this process.
On a direct question if SSE would lobby for a different outcome, the
board member representing the traded companies at the time stated
that:” No, and I think it was because the exchange did not see the de-
mand [for trading with options] as particularly big” (Wolrath, author
translation). When asked about the investigation the CTO of the ex-
change repeatedly stated that” it was a little sensitive, you can call it a
little sensitive” (Hellberg, author translation).
Data used to show the extent and quality of the corporate political
activities of the entrant OM between 1983 and 1993 (Ernkvist, 2015)
was supplemented by data on the actions and opinions of the Stockholm
Stock Exchange. Out of 23 incidents where the exchange or actors re-
presenting the exchange discussed regulatory issues only at one point
did the CEO discuss the potential removal of the monopoly in the SSE
quarterly report where he was in favor of removing it. Two main rea-
sons can be put forward for the general silence from the exchange about
the emerging options markets. First, the exchange did write a report
themselves preceding the official government investigation that ended
up inconclusive with the actors in the investigation being split about the
issue. Secondly, while the CEO was increasingly positive towards a free
market during the studied period, the VP was against marketplaces
being run making a profit.
While part of the explanation had to do with differences between
the often market-oriented CEO and the VP, who rather had a back-
ground in law another part is structural. In the final stage of the in-
vestigation, the government investigation did recommend the removal
of the monopoly, though it also recommended a strong means test that
in effect would mean that only actors who passed strong requirements
for “the public good of society” would be able to enter the market. This
was noted by three of the members of the committee who wrote a re-
servation about it stating that this would mean that the monopoly
would stay in place. Perhaps surprisingly, all the 15 consultation bodies
including the Stockholm Stock Exchange followed this reservation and
recommended for the new regulation to absent from a strong means test
and go for a free market approach.
4.2. The telecommunications sector
Televerket was a Swedish state enterprise and regulator of the tel-
ecommunication market in Sweden. In 1980 it had a 70 years de facto
monopoly of the Swedish telecom market behind them (Karlsson, 1998
p 75). The new pro-market ideas, shifts in opinion along with techno-
logical advances started to affect the telecommunications sector. Sig-
nificant actors, including Televerket themselves, had initiated a far
more pro-market rhetoric under the leadership of Tony Hagström who
was the head of Televerket 1977–1993. For instance, before the
launching of Teletex and Telefax he proposed a separation of Tele-
verket's regulatory tasks and telephone service monopoly and that their
Teletex and Telefax services should compete with other actors on the
market.
Table 4
Important events related to the Stockholm Stock Exchange.
Year Important event
1863 The trading with equities is gathered in the Stockholm Stock Exchange - It becomes a de facto monopoly
1980 A new law making SSE a de jure monopoly
1984 OM - an options market - is founded and granted a temporary license to operate
1986 SOFE - An additional options market is founded and starts to operate
1986 An government inquiry into the options market is launched
1986 Stockholm Stock Exchange launches an inquiry into the options market but fail to produce a consensus
1987 The government inquiry into the options market is inconclusive and is merged into the inquiry on the whole financial market
1989 The government inquiry into the financial markets recommend removing the monopoly
1990 A decision to remove the monopoly is taken
1992 The new law removing the monopoly comes into effect
1997 OM acquire Stockholm Stock Exchange
1
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2
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4
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30
37
Fig. 1. All decisions made by various government bodies concerning the emergence of entrant firms in the financial exchanges sector who started operating next to
the government monopoly of the Stockholm Stock Exchange.
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There were small exceptions to this monopoly over the years. In the
1950s the private telecommunications company “Företagstelefon”, had
been given permission to provide internal telecommunication services
to private companies – but not to private persons. In the 1970s
Företagstelefon, who now had changed its name to Comvik, tried to
expand their business to private customers and to the new mobile tel-
ephone technology. However, Televerket consistently put obstacles in
the way of Comvik's expansion plan – this despite Televerket's official
position as favoring competition and pro market reforms. From 1980 to
1993 Televerket and Comvik was in recurrent conflict regarding the
conditions for Comvik on the telecommunications market. The conflict
evolved around three specific issues during the 1980s:
1) Televerket forbid Comvik to use automatic switches. Since
Televerket themselves used automatic switches which were sig-
nificantly more effective for connecting calls than manual ones
Comvik opposed this restriction. Through substantial proactive non-
market activities towards many different government agencies in-
cluding the Näringsombudsmannen (NO) body, which was an in-
dependent legal authority for solving issues and conflicts on market
conditions, Comvik did eventually get permission for automatic
switches through a government decision in 1981.
2) In the middle of the 1980s Comvik wanted to expand their fre-
quencies from 36 to 60. Televerket, who had 180 frequencies, de-
legated the decision to the government since they considered
themselves biased in this issue. However, they still recommended
the government to deny Comvik's demand for more frequencies
since it, according to their claim, would lead to technical difficulties
that put the quality of the whole telecommunication service in
Sweden at risk. Again, Comvik started an extensive campaign on
several frontiers including media, academia, government and NO.
Televerket was, again, relatively passive in their the non-market
activity. In 1987 Comvik was granted 14 more frequencies and
hence ended up with 50 frequencies in total.
3) In the late 1980s Comvik wanted to buy AIX-switches from long
time Televerket collaborator Ericsson. Surprisingly, Ericsson denied
Comviks order. This made Comvik suspect that Televerket had
pressed Ericsson not to sell the switches to Comvik. Something that
Televerket denied. Again, proactive non-market activity was in-
itiated through many different channels.
In sum, Comvik won all political battles against Televerket in the
1980s. Below, we describe the role of policy and some of the activities
of Televerket and Comvik.
4.2.1. Regulation and oversight
As is clearly shown in Fig. 2, the department of communications, the
government/politicians and NO were all more pro-entrant than pro-
incumbent - hence more pro competition on equal terms - as mediators
and decision-makers in the conflict between Comvik and Televerket.
The NO body was a juridical instance that mediated conflicts regarding
market conditions in Sweden. The Communications department im-
plemented the political decisions from the government and also worked
as an advisory and referral body before government decisions. The
government is made up of the politicians that has the power over
government and hence not just a part of the parliament. The virtue of
competition and innovation is emphasized in many parts of society
including public investigations and in debates on the future of the tel-
ecommunication sector.
Already in 1980 NO raised the question whether Televerket should
decide on issues regarding connections to the public net since they also
were a player in the market. In a referral to a public investigation for
the telecommunication policy, preceding a government proposal, they
wrote:
“Although it has not yet appeared that Televerket has abused their
power as an approval body for connection of private equipment to
the public net NO does think that the government should consider
the conditions for another policy promoting competition on more
equal terms”.
(NO referral 1980-01-11)
The same year the government made a proposition for clearer di-
vision of roles for Televerket as well as less barriers for connections of
private equipment to the public net:
“The proposition/bill to some respect also mentions a new focus on
the telecommunications policy as to which equipment may be
connected to the telecommunications network. Private suppliers will
thereby have increased opportunities to provide subscriber equip-
ment in addition to telecommunications. Furthermore, the im-
portance of clearly distinguishing the telecommunications agency's
authority data from the business activities is emphasized. A new
procedure for dealing with the testing and approval of subscriber
equipment for connection to the telecommunications network
should therefore be introduced.”
(Government Proposition 1980)
21
14
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42
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24
Fig. 2. the decisions made by various government bodies
concerning the emergence of new competition in the
telecommunications sector. As can be seen, all govern-
ment bodies were during this time period over-
whelmingly favoring more competition and the entry of
new firms rather than the government monopoly
Televerket.
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However, it would linger to 1987 until there were significant
changes in the policy of telecommunication in Sweden. This year the
Communications agency suggested the abolishment of the PBX mono-
poly (monopoly of telephone switches) – basically meaning free com-
petition for telecommunication services. In the referral answers most
actors were positive to the abolishment of this monopoly and NO, who
now had become a key player in the conflict between Comvik and
Televerket, also suggested that the permission of connection of PBX to
the public net should not be granted by Televerket, who as a player in
this market was biased, but by a new independent agency called Statens
Telenämnd:
“The PBX Monopoly should be abolished. Such categories of man-
agement decisions, which concern areas where the Televerket op-
erates commercially in competition with others, should be taken by
the Statens telenämnd at first instance.”
In a proposition in early 1988 the government followed the re-
commendations of the Communications agency and NO:
“Further, it is suggested that a new authority, Statens telenämnd, is
established and takes over the duties of Televerket to issue regula-
tions on the connection of equipment to the public tele-
communications network. The exclusive rights of the tele-
communications network to connect PBX and coin machines to the
public telecommunications network are proposed to expire no later
than 1 January 1990 and 1 January 1989 respectively.”
(Government proposition/Bill 1987/88: 118 on telecommunications
policy)
The parliament did approve this part of the government bill/pro-
position and Televerket was stripped of both their PBX monopoly and
their role as permission decider for connection of private equipment to
the public net. Finally, in 1993 the government suggested the transition
of Televerket to a corporation (and the changing of the name to Telia)
which would hand over all regulatory tasks to Statens Telenämnd and
Telestyrelsen.
4.2.2. Competitive dynamics
During Televerket's conflicts with Comvik several aspects are
striking, namely the will of Televerket to compete in the Teletex and
Telefax businesses, a tendency to engage in a pro-competition rhetoric,
and the unwillingness to compete on equal terms with Comvik on the
mobile telephone service. While Televerket tried to obstruct and stop
Comvik from entering the market, the organization often made public
statements saying that they were in favor of more competition.
When looking at Televerket's activities vis-à-vis regulatory bodies, it
is clear that the organization was not able to engage in regulatory
capture. Comvik was granted what they asked for and Televerket was
first and foremost a defensive actor. The number of proactive measures
taken by the organization to influence the regulatory set-up were very
limited.
As is clearly shown in Fig. 2, NO, the department of communication
and the government/politicians were more pro Comvik than pro Tele-
verket. Comvik's non-market activities stand in contrast to Televerket's
in numerous ways. Comvik is almost entirely proactive in its non-
market activities.
5. Analysis and discussion
Our results show that in both the Swedish financial sector and in the
telecommunications industry, policies were enacted in order to en-
courage competition and the emergence of de novo entrant firms.
Figs. 1 and 2 illustrate that during about one decade, policies enacted
by both elected politicians and supervisory and regulatory bodies such
as the Royal Bank Inspection and the NO made decisions that favored
both the emergence of new entrants and the transformation of incum-
bent monopolists into actors competing on an open market.
Revisiting the typology of innovation policies as depicted by Potts
et al. (2016), it is clear that the role of policy in these two successful TTs
was largely one of removing barriers to innovation and entrepreneur-
ship rather than one of providing supporting structures. Our digital
archive does not indicate the presence of any significant supporting
initiatives that have had any considerable impact. To the contrary, the
role of government seems to have been to through their own decisions
and via various supervisory bodies such as the Bank Inspection and the
NO encourage industrial and technological renewal on a broader scale.
It is clear that on numerous occasions, vested interest groups such as
Televerket in the telecommunications sector, banks and the SSE in the
financial sector, were not able to captivate the regulatory process and
influence it to their favor. Brokers who lost their jobs due to the
emergence of digital stock trading were not able to hinder progress. The
SSE remained passive and mostly neutral concerning the emergence of
new actors. Televerket tried several times to influence regulation to
their favor but lost to an entrant firm in the form of Comvik. Most of the
time, Televerket had to remain defensive and was not able to exert any
considerable political influence. If anything, our data rather suggests
that entrant firms such as OM and Comvik were, despite their limited
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Fig. 3. Share of Televerket's non-market activities that were proactive, defensive, anticipatory and reactive during the time period 1980–1990. For more information
on the coding scheme, see Oliver and Holzinger (2008).
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size, able to proactively influence and shape regulations to their favor.
5.1. The avoidance of regulatory capture
Why did regulatory capture by vested interest groups as depicted in
conventional economics (Carleheden, 1999) not occur in the two cases
described above?
Incumbent interests usually have advantages in the form of superior
financial and relational resources (Mokyr, 1994). Moreover, as argued
by Potts et al. (2016), policies favoring the removal of resistance to
innovation and entrepreneurship are often difficult to enact. While such
policies may create a lot of economic value, this value is distributed
throughout society across voters who may obtain more valuable offers
on the market and across de novo entrants who may stand to reap
benefits from e.g. the opening of a markets. As these actors are usually
dispersed and immobilized, the benefits for politicians in adhering to
these actors is usually low.
Conversely, policies aimed at removing obstacles tend to generate a
damage that is concentrated to small and potentially influential interest
groups. In sum, politicians are unlikely to support policies aimed at
removing resistance to innovation and entrepreneurship as the benefits
of these policies are usually both unrealized and distributed while the
costs are concentrated to specific actors in society who are strongly
incentivized to block any attempts to distort their power. Drawing upon
the framework by Geels (2004), our findings point at several enabling
conditions, which include experimentation in niches, support within
the established socio-technical regime (ST) and a macro landscape that
made it increasingly possible to enact pro-competition policies. These
levels are reviewed in the following sub-section.
5.2. The presence of niche experiments
Both the telecommunications industry and the financial sectors
contained various niche experiments enabled by digital technology. In
the telecommunications sector, the entrant firm Comvik offered an al-
ternative mobile phone service adjacent to the government monopoly
Televerket. In the financial sector, OM emerged next to the SSE with a
platform for options trading that grew rapidly. At the same time, the
CEO of the SSE had a vision of a fully electronic stock exchange which
required a considerable departure from the status quo.
5.3. The socio-technical regime
According to Geels (2004), the presence of niche experiments is an
important and necessary precondition for TTs to occur, but resistance
within the established ST usually implies that this does not happen,
especially bearing in mind that benefits are dispersed and damage is
concentrated to vested interest groups who often posit abilities to ob-
struct and little incentives to change (Battilana, 2006).
A couple of factors prevented such blockages from taking place in
our cases. To start with, there seems to have been enough anticipated
gains from the niche actors to gather support from private interests
within the ST regime. Comvik was piling up losses during the entire
1980s, but was nevertheless backed by Jan Stenbeck, a powerful in-
dustrialist who owned and controlled several established industries in
Sweden. When the telecommunications sector was opened for compe-
tition in the 1990s, Stenbeck's firms Comvik and Tele2 quickly gained
considerable market share and became profitable operators. Financial
and rhetorical support from a powerful conglomerate like Stenbeck's
Kinnevik was probably a factor contributing to Comvik's success in the
political domain in the 1980s. This support can in turn probably be
explained by the considerable private gains that could be obtained by
Stenbeck in a subsequent stage.
Similar mechanisms were present in the financial sector. While OM
was founded by a private entrepreneur, the firm was from its onset
supported by a prominent capitalist family in Sweden, the powerful
Wallenberg family. Wallenberg owned a considerable portion of shares
in OM, which meant that its retail bank SEB along with a collection of
other actors supported OM. Thus, OM gained legitimacy in the early
stages and was in many ways sheltered by being connected with the
Wallenberg family.
Likewise, the SSE harnessed considerable political support when its
CEO initiated formulation of a long term strategic vision and mission of
becoming “the best national stock exchange in the world”. In the pro-
cess of bridging diverging interest under this long-term strategy, the
CEO could draw on his previous experience as president in SNS where
he had been involved in several reform projects involving efforts to
reach consensus among Swedish politicians, business leaders and re-
presentatives from interest groups. When facing resistance from brokers
who saw a risk of losing their jobs due to digitalization, he could rely
upon a board that was largely supporting him.
When looking at resistance within the ST, it is also clear that these
actors were not able to exert considerable influence. Televerket had to
remain defensive vis-à-vis Comvik and the regulatory bodies. In the
financial sector, the SSE left OM untouched in its niche and did not pay
any attention to OM, perhaps because it was not in direct competition
with the SSE.
5.4. The Landscape level
Our empirical description also shows that change agents could
harness support from macro trends on the landscape level.
Technological advancements rendered previously taken for granted
monopolist positions of Televerket and the SSE obsolete. Trends to-
wards deregulation and more competition had already come into mo-
tion abroad. Both Comvik and OM were influenced by these trends in
their respective industries as they made use of new technology to rea-
lize new business opportunities in Sweden. Shifts in public opinion
towards more deregulation and increased competition also put politi-
cians in a position where they could enact such policies instead of being
subjected to regulatory capture (Karlson, 2017).
5.5. The role of policy in promoting TTs
In sum, we observe that the role of policy in facilitating industrial
renewal and TTs to take place was largely about removing obstacles and
creating conditions where de novo entrants could grow and transform
the sector. According to conventional economics, the political cost of
enacting such policies is often high. In the two cases described above,
we argue that policymakers were able to avoid regulatory capture due
to the combination of factors described to be present in Geels' (2004)
multi-level framework. The presence of niche experiments, limited re-
sistance in the ST, powerful supporters in the ST and trends on the
Landscape level made it possible for policymakers to undertake the
initiatives necessary for accomplishing successful TTs. Our findings are
therefore largely in line with Geels' framework. The primary contribu-
tion rather lies in highlighting the role played by policy in generating
large-scale sector transformation.
While we acknowledge that innovation policies did contribute to the
removal of barriers and not end up in a situation of regulatory capture,
we regard these cases as exceptional. In general, innovation policy in
the Western world is likely to become overly focused on support and
often, too little effort will be devoted to dealing with vested interest
groups (Potts et al., 2016). Moreover, recent evaluations of R&D sub-
sidies and various innovation support schemes show negligible effects
on firm turnover and job growth over time (Gustafsson et al., 2016a,
2016b), negative effects in sparsely populated areas (Tingvall and
Videnord, 2018) and result in the emergence of subsidy entrepreneurs,
i.e. firms that systematically exploit public support schemes
(Gustafsson, 2017; Gustafsson, 2018).
Innovation policy in the Western world has to a large extent been
concerned with creating support structures for R&D, including
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mechanisms for technology transfer, publicly sponsored research and
education, along with various support schemes aimed at small firms.
When such policies are implemented without properly dealing with
vested interests, they are unlikely to result in industrial renewal. We
therefore argue that innovation policy for renewal of Western econo-
mies is largely a matter of removing barriers and dealing with interest
groups in a strategically sound manner rather than the creation of
various support structures that seem to have limited effects on renewal.
We acknowledge several limitations of our study. First, both fi-
nancial exchanges and the telecommunications sector are very complex
industries with many and intertwined actors. While our data and re-
lated methods enable us to provide a rich empirical description of two
sectors over a full decade, we observe that there is vast research on
various aspects of these industries within economics, management,
sociology and business history and policy (Andersson, 2000; Gorham
and Singh, 2009; Markham and Harty, 2011; Carleheden (1999);
Karlsson (1998); Lernevall and Åkesson (1997); Englund, 1999;
Carleheden, 1999; Ernkvist, 2015). We regard the empirical descrip-
tions in this paper as complementary and the primary contribution lies
in our quantifications of various policies and activities by different
actors.
Second, as our research only concerns two sectors in one country,
we welcome further empirical research on this issue, especially in
sectors where the interplay between regulations, vested interests and
technology are important. The taxi industry's response to Uber's entry
would be of interest to study in further detail (Laurell and Sandström,
2016; Laurell and Sandström, 2017). In many countries, gambling has
also been subjected to techno-regulatory turbulence over the past
decade due to the emergence of online casinos and online betting.
Generally, we welcome further research on how policymakers can deal
with vested interest groups and accomplish renewal (Karlson, 2017).
6. Concluding remarks and future research
In this paper, we have explored how industrial renewal takes place
in mature Western economies. In particular, we have addressed the role
of policy in successfully accomplishing a Technological Transition.
Drawing upon a dataset spanning two industries over an entire
decade, we show that policy was consistently geared towards favoring
competition and de novo entrants. Hence, regulatory capture in its
conventional sense, did not occur. To the contrary, policymakers were
consistently acting in order to favor the emergence of de novo en-
trepreneurial firms who paved the way for technological and institu-
tional changes. Our primary contribution therefore lies in pointing out
that successful innovation policy can be about dealing with resistance
rather than supporting experiments (Juma, 2016; Potts et al., 2016) and
in explaining under what circumstances regulatory capture can be
avoided.
Drawing upon Geels' (2004) multi-level framework for studying TTs
we explain this pattern by highlighting that several enabling conditions
were present in both the telecommunications sector and the financial
sector. Niche experiments were taking place and could gain a foothold
in the ST regime due to limited resistance, strong support from both
powerful interest groups and policymakers. Several macro trends on the
landscape level did further enable TTs to take place. Our findings
suggest that successful innovation policy in mature economies is largely
a matter of overcoming resistance from interest groups rather than
creating support structures.
We welcome further research on the role of policy in accomplishing
industrial renewal in Western economies. Specifically, issues related to
regulatory capture and how vested interest groups can be managed are
of considerable importance for future research. With regards to
methods, we note that the use of digital archives has made it possible to
cover and analyze vast amounts of data across longer periods of time.
Previously laborious historical methods are enabled by the considerable
productivity improvements obtained from being able to search for
relevant documents. Also, digital archives open up new opportunities
for collaboration and comparisons across historical cases. We would
argue that digitalization in a broader sense opens up for the increased
prevalence of historical methods in management and economics
(Gustafsson et al., 2016a, 2016b) and acknowledge that this issue
merits further investigation.
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Appendix 1. Digital archives
The study is based on a larger research effort to collect archival data
on the telecommunication- and financial exchange sector in Sweden,
covering both regulatory bodies, official investigations into the sectors,
incumbent and entrants as well as key interest association (Geissinger
et al., 2018; Ernkvist, 2015). The majority of archives are organiza-
tional archives, but the list also includes a few personal archives from
key actors in the development.
Archive research methods in general is a process in which the col-
lection of data is depending on a range of conditions and practical
challenges for researcher. The (i) existence of preserved archive for
organizations and their preservation policy is a fundamental condition
for research. In addition to these, there are practical challenges for
archive research related to: (ii) the identification of archive, (iii) se-
curing access conditions to archives, (iv) evaluation of the archives
preservation process and potential biases, (v) the researchers selection
of documents and (vi) the methods to systematically analyze collected
archival records – in our case based on digitalization, OCR and a rela-
tional database with structured added metadata.
The core set of archives was identified in the beginning of the larger
research project, while a few also were added later as the role and in-
volvement of different organizations in the policy process became more
evident.
This identification was supported by an effort to gain a rich con-
textual understandings of the sector aided by: close reading of sec-
ondary literature on both sectors, analysis of the final government of-
ficial investigations which describes the role of various actors in both
sectors, the construction of events & timelines of the policy process,
interviews with actors, keyword search in the database on organiza-
tions, news coverage of both sectors and the reading of the Swedish
parliaments discussion of both sectors in various documentary series
(e.g. political debates, proposals and government questions) of the
sector. The complete digitalization of these parliament records (1971
onward) as part of “The Riksdag's open data” (https://data.riksdagen.
se) made possible keyword search.
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